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1 Introduction
The Synthetic Control Method (SCM) introduced by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003),
and further developed in Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) is becoming very popular in program
evaluation. SCM is attractive, as it allows estimating the causal effect of an intervention
even when data on only one treated and a few control units are available. This is possible
by using information on the pre-intervention period to construct a “synthetic control”,
which mimics what would have happened to the treated unit in the post-intervention
period in the absence of the intervention. Gobillon and Magnac (2016) compare SCM
to other interactive fixed-effects models and find that it performs very well as soon as in
post-intervention periods the counterfactual outcome of the treated unit lies in the convex
hull of the outcomes of the control units. In a recent paper, Xu (2017) further exploits the
connection between SCM and interactive fixed-effect models and proposes a new method
that combines both approaches. Doudchenko and Imbens (2016) propose a modification
of SCM where the weights are not constrained to be positive and do not necessarily add
up to 1. Ben-Michael et al. (2018) extend it to relax weights constraints and to correct
for possible covariate imbalance, demonstrating that the synthetic control method can
be seen as an inverse propensity score weighting estimator. Finally, Athey et al. (2017)
propose a new method that includes synthetic control and other panel data methods as a
special case.
Although all those methods are very well suited for estimating the “total” effect of
an intervention, they are mostly uninformative about the causal mechanisms that gen-
erated this effect. Often an intervention may first have an impact on an intermediate
outcome (hereafter referred to also as the “mediator”), which induces an impact on the
final outcome. In the presence of a mediator, the total effect can generally be decomposed
into a direct effect of the intervention and an indirect effect generated through it. Policy
conclusions that ignore the presence of such intermediate outcomes might be misleading.
Indeed, if the direct and indirect effects are both large and similar in magnitude but with
opposite signs, one might wrongly conclude that the policy had no impact, by just look-
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ing at the total effect. Moreover, it is often important to quantify the direct and indirect
effects to better target the intervention. Consider the huge decrease in tobacco consump-
tion after the introduction of California’s anti-tobacco law, Proposition 99, estimated in
Abadie et al. (2010). Proposition 99 not only increased the tobacco price but also intro-
duced several anti-tobacco informational campaigns. It would be extremely relevant for
a policy maker to know how much of the decrease in tobacco consumption triggered by
Proposition 99 is due to the increase in prices and how much of it is due to investments
in informational campaigns.
The analysis of direct and indirect effects of an intervention may give additional infor-
mation on macroeconomic mechanisms as well. Consider the impact of euro adoption on
labor productivity. It may be highly relevant to determine whether an increase/decrease
in labor productivity is due to a variation in the level of specialization of exporting firms
and in the type of goods exported or to other factors. As we will show in our empirical
application, estimating only the total effect could be highly misleading in this framework.
Mediation analysis is a standard approach to deal with these kind of issues. The
main challenge in mediation analysis is that the identification of the direct and indirect
effects requires knowledge about the potential outcome an individual would get if the
potential mediator was set to the value it would have taken under the opposite treatment
status than the one observed. This is never observed for any individual. A large part of
the literature focuses on identification and estimation of direct and indirect effects under
sequential conditional independence (see Pearl 2001; Robins 2003; Imai et al. 2010; Imai
and Yamamoto 2013; Vansteelandt and VanderWeele 2012; Huber 2013; Vansteelandt
and VanderWeele 2012; Huber et al. 2016, 2017). The idea behind this approach is that
once we control for observed characteristics and the conditionally independent treatment
the potential outcomes are independent of the potential mediators. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the existing methods are specifically designed for panel data and
cannot directly be applied in settings with one or a few treated and a few control units.1
This motivates the introduction of our mediation analysis synthetic control (MASC)
1One exception is Deuchert et al. (2018), however, who consider a framework with a randomized
intervention with non-perfect compliance.
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method, a generalization of the SCM that allows decomposing the total effect of an inter-
vention into its direct and indirect components. As we will discuss below, in contrast to
the standard framework, where the additional assumptions required to identify the direct
and indirect effects are usually much stronger, MASC requires virtually the same assump-
tions on unobserved confounders as a standard SCM. The only additional assumption is
that we are able to find control units with mediator values similar to those of the treated
unit. Moreover, the plausibility of the assumptions required for MASC can be judged in
a similar manner by checking the overlap in pre-treament outcomes in a standard SCM.
MASC can be easily implemented by using existing SCM algorithms and any of the
new extensions. Indeed, as we will discuss in more detail below, to identify the direct
and indirect effects MASC re-weights control unit post-intervention outcomes by choosing
weights that minimize the distance between treated and synthetic unit in pre-intervention
observable characteristics (including pre-intervention values of the outcome and the me-
diator) as well as in post-intervention values of the mediator. Intuitively, this allows us
to mimic what would have happened to the treated unit in absence of the intervention if
the mediator value were set to the potential mediator under treatment. As we mentioned
above this is the main challenge of mediation analysis. Following Abadie et al. (2010),
we illustrate MASC with a simple dynamic factor model with interactive fixed effects and
show that both the direct and the indirect effects estimators are unbiased as the number
of pre-intervention periods goes to infinity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces MASC; Section 3
proposes possible inference procedures; Section 4 includes an empirical application to the
introduction of the euro; and Section 5 concludes. All the technical proofs are relegated
to the online appendix.
2 The Mediation Analysis Synthetic Control Method
Assume that we are interested in the effect of an intervention, D, implemented at time T ,
on an outcome, Y . Suppose that part of the effect of D on Y goes through an observed
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intermediate outcome (mediator), M . The total effect of the intervention on the final
outcome can be decomposed into an indirect effect, which goes throughM , and a residual
effect, commonly known as the “direct effect”, which could also go through other, possibly
unobserved, causal pathways. Although often crucial for policy conclusions, identification
of the direct and the indirect effects may be challenging. To see this, let Dit be a binary
indicator that is equal to one if unit i is exposed to the intervention at time t. We will
refer to units that are exposed to the intervention as “treated” and to those that are not
exposed as “control”. Using the potential outcome framework (see, e.g., Rubin 1974), for
each unit, i, we can define the potential mediator at time t as follows:
Mit(d) for d ∈ {0, 1}.
Mit(d) is the value that the mediator of unit i would take, at time t, if Dit is set to d.
Assuming that there are no anticipation effects on the mediator in the pre-intervention
period and that the standard stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) holds, the
observed and the potential mediators are related through the following observation rule:
Mit = Mit(0)(1−Dit) +Mit(1)Dit.
Note that Mit is always equal to Mit(0) for both treated and control units in the pre-
intervention period, t < T , and that we can observe only one of the two potential mediators
for each unit in the post-intervention period, t ≥ T .
Similarly, for each unit i at time t, we define the potential outcomes as
Yit(d,Mit(d
′)) ≡ Y d,d′it for d, d′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Y d,d
′
it is the value that the outcome of unit i would take at time t if we set Dit = d
and Mit = Mit(d′). The potential outcome is a function of both the treatment and
the potential mediator. Under SUTVA, and assuming no anticipation effects in the pre-
intervention period, the observed and the potential outcomes are related by the following
4
observation rule:
Yit = Y
0,0
it (1−Dit) + Y 1,1it Dit.
Differently from the standard setting, we have for each unit four instead of two potential
outcomes. As usual, only one between Y 0,0it and Y
1,1
it can be observed for each unit in each
period, while Y 0,1it and Y
1,0
it are never observed for any unit in any period. Assuming no
anticipation effects, Yit = Y 0,0it in the pre-intervention period for all units.
Following the synthetic control literature, we will define our parameters of interest with
respect to a single treated unit. This is in contrast with the standard mediation analysis
literature, where the total, the direct, and the indirect effects are defined as averages,
either with respect to the whole sample (Pearl 2001; Robins 2003; Imai et al. 2010; Imai
and Yamamoto 2013; Vansteelandt and VanderWeele 2012; Huber 2013) or with respect to
the treated units(Vansteelandt and VanderWeele 2012; Huber et al. 2017). Nonetheless,
if more than one unit is exposed to the intervention (see (Gobillon and Magnac, 2016;
Adhikari, 2015)) our method can be easily used to decompose the average treatment effect
on the treated.
We assume that we observe J units ordered such that units 1 through n are treated,
while units n + 1 through J are controls. Without loss of generality, we will present our
results for the first treated unit, unit 1, only. Since we have four potential outcomes
instead of two, we can now define more parameters than in the standard synthetic control
framework each measuring the effect implied by a different thought experiment. Indeed,
each potential outcome represents a different state of the world, and one can in principle
define effects by calculating the difference between a pair of potential outcomes. Intu-
itively, Y 0,01t and Y
1,1
1t measure the value that the outcome of the first treated unit would
take with and without intervention. On the other hand, Y 0,11t and Y
1,0
1t measure the values
that the outcome of the treated unit would take if the value of the mediator was pushed to
the value it would take under the opposite treatment status. Intuitively, given that policy
makers typically cannot choose which value the mediator takes, Y 0,11t is arguably a more
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interesting counterfactual than and Y 1,01t . Indeed, to reproduce Y
0,1
1t policy makers would
need to pushM toM(0) in the absence of the intervention by, for example, implementing
alternative policies that target the mediator directly. In contrast to reproduce Y 1,01t they
would need to implement the intervention and at the same time push M to M(0), neu-
tralizing the effect on the mediator. This would require implementing the intervention
simultaneously with additional policies that have the opposite effect on the mediator.
The effects of interest with regard to unit 1 are the total effect, α1t, which compares
the outcomes the treated unit would get with and without the intervention; the direct
effect, θ1t(M1t(1)), which compares the treated potential outcome with the intervention
and the outcome without intervention but where the mediator is set to the value it would
have taken with the intervention; and the indirect effect, δ1t(0), which measures the effect
of pushing the mediator to its level under the intervention but without implementing the
intervention. All parameters are assumed to be zero in the pre-intervention period and
are in the post-intervention period defined as
α1t = Y
1,1
1t − Y 0,01t ,
θ1t(M1t(1)) = Y
1,1
1t − Y 0,11t ,
δ1t(0) = Y
0,1
1t − Y 0,01t , t ≥ T.
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It is easy to see that the total effect, α1t, can be decomposed into2:
α1t = Y
1,1
1t − Y 0,01t ,
= Y 1,11t − Y 0,11t + Y 0,11t − Y 0,01t ,
= θ1t(M1t(1)) + δ(0).
The decomposition above shows that if α1t is identified, identifying θ1t(M1t(1)) automat-
ically implies identification of δit(0) = α1t − θ1t(M1t(1)).
The idea behind SCM is to use a linear combination of the control units to build a
“synthetic control” that mimics what would have happened to the treated unit in the post
intervention period in the absence of the intervention. In other words, SCM creates a
synthetic value of Y 0,01t in the post-intervention period. This is done by re-weighting the
post-treatment outcomes of control units by using weights that are chosen so that they
minimize the distance between the pre-intervention observable characteristics (including
pre-intervention outcomes) of the treated and synthetic units. The main assumption is
that Y 0,01t lies in the convex hull of the non-treated post-intervention outcomes. Thus, it
can be written as a linear combination of the latter.
MASC generalizes this idea to create “synthetic” values of Y 0,11t in the post intervention
period. For Y 0,11t , we propose to re-weight the control unit post-intervention outcomes by
choosing weights that minimize the distance between treated and control pre-intervention
observable characteristics as well as post-intervention values of the mediator. The intuition
is that choosing the weights that minimize the distance between treated and synthetic
with respect to post-treatment values of the mediator as well will mimic what would have
2In the mediation literature the following alternative decomposition is often also considered:
α1t = Y
1,1
1t − Y 0,01t ,
= Y 1,11t − Y 1,01t + Y 1,01t − Y 0,01t ,
= δ1t(1) + θ1t(M1t(0)),
where δ1t(1) = Y
1,1
1t − Y 1,01t and θ1t(M1t(0)) = Y 1,01t − Y 0,01t . We decide not to focus on this decomposition
for two reasons. First, as we argue above, a policy maker would need to be able to neutralize the effect
of the treatment on the mediator to reproduce Y 1,01t . Second, identification of Y
1,0
1t requires additional
assumptions and the ability to observe more than one treated unit.
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happened to the treated unit in the absence of the intervention but fixing the mediator
value to the its value with the intervention, M1t(1).
In both MASC and SCM, the main identification assumption is that the unobserved
confounders are either time invariant or, if time varying, they change in the same way for
all units. To further illustrate our approach, in the spirit of Abadie et al. (2010), we will
introduce a factor model in which we assume that potential mediators of unit i are given
by
Mit(0) = γt + βtZi + ϑt%i + νit,
Mit(1) = γt + βtZi + ϑt%i + ψtDit + νit,
where γt is an unknown common factor with constant factor loadings across units. Zi
is a (p × 1) vector of observed covariates, βt is a (1 × p) vector of unknown parameters,
ϑt is a (1 × v) vector of unobserved common factors, %i is a (v × 1) vector of unknown
factor loadings, ψit is an unknown parameter describing the impact of the treatment on
the mediator, and νit are unobserved transitory shocks.
Similarly, we assume that the four potential outcomes are given by
Y 0,0it = ζt + ηtXi + λtµi + ϕt(0)Mit(0) + it,
Y 0,1it = ζt + ηtXi + λtµi + ϕt(0)Mit(1) + it,
Y 1,0it = ζt + ηtXi + λtµi + ϕt(1)Mit(0) + ρt(Mit(0))Dit + it,
Y 1,1it = ζt + ηtXi + λtµi + ϕt(1)Mit(1) + ρt(Mit(1))Dit + it,
where ζt is an unknown common factor with constant factor loadings across units; Xi is an
(r×1) vector of observed covariates that includes all the variables included in Zi but might
also include other observable variables, which affects the treatment and the outcome but
not the mediator; ηt is a (1 × r) vector of unknown parameters; λt is a (1 × F ) vector
of unobserved common factors; µi is an (F × 1) vector of unknown factor loadings; it
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are unobserved transitory shocks; and ϕit(d) and ρit(Mit(d)) capture the impact, on the
potential outcomes, of the potential mediator and the treatment, respectively. In this
model the total, direct, and indirect effects of unit 1 are then given by
α1t = ϕt(1)Mit(1)− ϕt(0)Mit(0) + ρt(Mit(1)),
θ1t(M1t(1)) = ρt(M1t(1)) + (ϕt(1)− ϕt(0))M1t(1),
δ1t(0) = ϕt(0)(M1t(1)−M1t(0)).
As mentioned above, for the total effect we can just use the standard SCM. In partic-
ular, we assume that there exists a (1× (J − n)) vector of weights L∗ = (l∗n+1, ..., l∗J) that
are positive, adding up to 1, and such that in the post-intervention period
Y 0,01t =
J∑
i=n+1
l∗i Yit.
As in Abadie et al. (2015) we assume that ∀ t = 1, ..., T − 1, L∗ also satisfies
J∑
j=n+1
l∗jYjt = Y1t,
J∑
j=n+1
l∗jMjt = M1t,
J∑
j=n+1
l∗jXj = X1.
This justifies the choice of weights that minimize the distance between the observable
characteristics of the treated unit and the control units in the pre-treatment period.
More formally, let Ωα1 = (X1, Y11, . . . , Y1,T−1,M11, . . . ,M1,T−1) be a ((2(T − 1) + r) × 1)
vector, ωα0i = (Xi, Yi1, . . . , Yi,T−1,Mi1, . . . ,Mi,T−1) be a (1 × (2(T − 1) + r)) vector, and
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Ωα0 = (ω
α
0,n+1, . . . , ω
α
0J)
′. Then
L∗ = min
ln+1,...,lJ
||Ωα1 − LΩα0 ||
s.t. ln+1 ≤ 0, ..., lJ ≤ 0,
J∑
i=n+1
li = 1,
where ||Ωα1 − LΩα0 || =
√
(Ωα1 − LΩα0 )′ (Ωα1 − LΩα0 ). It is also possible to give more weight
to specific observable characteristics by using the alternative distance ||Ωα1 − LΩα0 ||V =√
(Ωα1 − LΩα0 )′ V (Ωα1 − LΩα0 ) (see Abadie et al. 2010, for a data driven procedure to choose
V ).
Let Yˆ 0,01t =
∑J
i=n+1 l
∗
i Yit, Abadie et al. (2010) show that, if L∗ exists, for t ≥ T
E(Yˆ 0,01t ) = Y
0,0
1t + o(T )
Consequently, estimating the total effect as αˆ1t = Y1t − Yˆ 0,01t is justified by the fact that
lim
T→∞
E(αˆ1t) = α1t ∀ t ≥ T (2.1)
The estimation of Y 0,11t in MASC requires additional constraints but no extra assump-
tions on the unobservable in the potential outcomes equations. Our goal is to construct
a “synthetic” unit, which is identical to the treated unit, not affected by the intervention,
and, at the same time, has the same value of the mediator as the treated unit. Similar to
standard SCM, we want to find a (1× (J −n)) vector weights W ∗t = (w∗n+1,t, ..., w∗Jt) that
are positive, adding up to 1, and such that in the post-intervention period
Y 0,11t =
J∑
i=n+1
w∗itYit.
Notice that, in our simple factor model, Y 0,11t depends on the value that M takes at time t
only. 3 Also notice that the weights need to be calculated in each post-intervention period
3It is easy to let Y 0,11t depend on all the values that the mediator takes be-
tween T and t. This is done by replacing Ωθt′ (1)1 and ω
θt′ (1)
0i defined below
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in this model. Let t′ ≥ T be the time at which we want to estimate the direct effect.
Similar to Abadie et al. (2010) we assume that W ∗t′ exists and satisfies ∀ t = 1, ..., T − 1:
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jt′Yjt = Y1t,
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jt′Xj = X1,
and ∀ t = 1, ..., T − 1, t′,
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jt′Mjt = M1t.
The vector of weights, W ∗t′ , is then estimated in a similar way as L∗. The only dif-
ference is that we now need to include the post-treatment mediator in the distance.
More formally, if we let Ωθt′ (1)1 = (X1, Y11, . . . , Y1,T−1,M11, . . . ,M1,T−1,M1,t′), ω
θt′ (1)
0i =
(Xi, Yi1, . . . , Yi,T−1,Mi1, . . . ,Mi,T−1,Mi,t′), and Ω
θt′ (1)
0 = (ω
θt′ (1)
n+1 , . . . , ω
θt′ (1)
J )
′, then
W ∗t′ = min
wn+1,t′ ,...,wJt′
||Ωθt′ (1)1 −Wt′Ωθt′ (1)0 ||V
s.t. wn+1,t′ ≤ 0, ..., wJt′ ≤ 0,
J∑
i=n+1
wit′ = 1,
where ||Ωθt′ (1)1 − Wt′Ωθt′ (1)0 ||V =
√(
Ω
θt′ (1)
1 −Wt′Ωθt′ (1)0
)′
V
(
Ω
θt′ (1)
1 −Wt′Ωθt′ (1)0
)
. Notice
that we only have one mediator in the post-intervention period and several pre-intervention
variables. Thus, we suggest to choose V such that equal weights are given to pre- and
post- intervention information.
Let Yˆ 0,11t′ =
∑J
i=n+1w
∗
it′Yit′ , as we show in the appendix, if W ∗t′ exists, under standard
regularity conditions:
E(Yˆ 0,11t′ ) = Y
0,1
1t′ + o(T ).
This allows us to estimate the direct effect as θ1t′(M1t(1)) and the indirect effect as δit′(0)
with Ωθt′ (1)1 = (X1, Y11, . . . , Y1,T−1,M11, . . . ,M1,T−1,M1,T , . . . ,M1,t′) and ω
θt′ (1)
0i =
(Xi, Yi1, . . . , Yi1,T−1,Mi1, . . . ,Mi,T−1,Mi,T , . . . ,Mi,t′), respectively.
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since
θˆ1t′(M1t′(1)) = Y1t′ − Yˆ 0,11t′ , δˆ1t′(0) = αˆ1t′ − θˆ1t′(M1t′(1)),
respectively, as it implies
lim
T→∞
E(θˆ1t′(M1t(1)1t) = θ1t′(M1t(1)1t) ∀ t ≥ T,
lim
T→∞
E(δˆit′(0)) = δit′(0) ∀ t ≥ T
Intuitively, W ∗t′ only exists if, in addition to the assumptions needed for a standard SCM,
there is also overlap in the post-intervention values of the mediation. Similarly to the
standard SCM, the plausibility of the existence of W ∗t′ can be graphically assessed by
looking at the overlap in the pre-intervention period between the observed outcome, Y1t,
and the synthetic outcome Yˆ 0,11t .
3 Inference
Inference can be carried over in a similar manner as for the standard synthetic control
method. For example, one can run similar placebo tests as the one suggested in Abadie
et al. (2015), estimating the effects (in our case also the direct and indirect effects) of
the intervention either before its implementation or for units not exposed to it. Abadie
et al. (2015) criticize the former type of placebo tests (often called in-time placebos),
arguing that there may be other shocks in the past affecting treated and control units
differently. They suggest to base inference on the ratio between post- and pre- intervention
root mean square prediction error (RMSPE). For unit i and synthetic outcome Yˆ d,d′ the
pre-intervention RMSPE can be defined as
RMSPEYˆ
d,d′ ,pre
i =
∑T−1
t=1 (Yi,t − Yˆ d,d
′
i,t )
2
T − 1 .
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The post RMSPE is defined similarly
RMSPEYˆ
d,d′ ,post
i =
∑t′
t=T (Yi,t′ − Yˆ d,d
′
i,t′ )
2
t′ − T − 1 .
The test statistic can then be defined as
TestY
d,d′
i =
RMSPEYˆ
d,d′ ,post
i
RMSPEYˆ
d,d′ ,pre
i
.
Under the null hypothesis of a zero effect of the intervention the distribution of
TestiY
d,d′ can be calculated using the non-treated units, as, for example, in Firpo and
Possebom (2018) and Chernozhukov et al. (2018).
Another possibility is to follow the approach outlined in Chernozhukov et al. (2018)
which can be easily adapted to our framework. Firpo and Possebom (2018) generalize
this method and show that it performs better than other classical inference methods.
Ferman and Pinto (2017) reconsider the ratio of post- and pre-RMSPE and show that
it performs better and is less sensitive to violations of the assumptions than the post-
intervention RMSPE on its own. The authors propose a different test statistic which is
robust serial correlation in the temporary shocks. A similar procedure has been proposed
by Chernozhukov et al. (2018).
Yet another inference procedure is described in Gobillon and Magnac (2016). This
procedure is based on different steps. First of all, the outcome of the treated unit is
reduced by the treatment effect. In our framework, the mediator of treated unit should
be reduced as well. this is easily done using standard SCM to estimate of the potential
mediator in the absence of the intervention. Then, 10,000 samples without replacement of
treated units are drawn from all units. For each of the 10,000 samples the selected units
should be used as treated units and the rest of the group as control, to apply MASC.
Finally, the estimated values are used to estimate the distribution of the treatment effects.
In our framework, this method would consist in the following steps:
1. Substitute Yit with Y ′it = Yit− αˆt for i = 1, ..., n and t ≥ T , where αt is given by the
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average among the total effects estimated.
2. Substitute Mit with M ′it = Mit − E(Mit − Mˆit(0)) for i = 1, ..., n and t ≥ T .
3. Iterate 10’000 times:
• Select n units.
• Apply MASC.
• Calculate the average total, direct, and indirect effects.
4. Use the calculated effects to determine the distribution of the real effects and do
inference.
We refer to Gobillon and Magnac (2016) for more details.
Note that this inference procedure, just as in Abadie et al. (2015), is based on the
strong assumption that the disturbances across units are exchangeable. Indeed, the ba-
sic ideas behind these methods is that the error terms of the placebos can be used to
approximate the error term of the treated unit.
In this framework there is a second source of uncertainty. Unfortunately, the choice
of the control units (donor pool) can dramatically affect the results. To solve this issue
Abadie et al. (2015) suggest to make a sensitivity test excluding each of the units in the
donor pool one by one (if the donor pool is particularly big, one can select a sample with
replacement from the donor pool). If the estimated effects do not change much, the results
are not sensitive to the chosen donor pool and can be considered to be robust.
4 Decomposing the Impact of Adopting the Euro on
Productivity: A Backstage Story
In this section we use MASC to estimate the causal effect of adoption of the euro on
labor productivity in several European countries and investigate the role of the Economic
Complexity Index as a possible causal mechanism. Several studies on the impact of
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euro adoption focus on trade outcomes. Rose (2000) finds a huge effect of being in
a monetary union on trade in ex-ante analysis. This study has been widely criticized
because its results, obtained from small and low-income countries, were extrapolated to
big and high-income countries. Subsequent studies, based on ex-post analysis, found lower,
although still positive and significant, impacts (Micco et al. 2003; Flam and Nordström
2006; Mancini-Griffoli and Pauwels 2006; De Nardis and Vicarelli 2003; Bun and Klaassen
2007; Berger and Nitsch 2008; Chintrakarn 2008; Saia 2017) with the exception of Silva and
Tenreyro (2010), who found a positive although non-significant effect (see also Baldwin
and Taglioni 2007 and Baldwin et al. 2008 for two literature reviews on gravity models).
Other studies focus on the impact of euro adoption on GDP. Pesaran et al. (2007) and
Žúdel and Melioris (2016) find positive effects for, respectively, the UK and Sweden (in
the hypothetical scenario of euro adoption by these two countries) and Slovakia. Puzzello
and Gomis-Porqueras (2018), who apply the SCM to multiple European countries, find
heterogeneous effects instead. According to their results, euro adoption had a negative
effect for Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy, while Ireland benefited from the common
currency. No significant impact is found for the Netherlands. Differently from previous
studies, Gabrielczak and Serwach (2017) use the SCM to estimate the impact of adopting
the euro on the economic complexity of Slovenia exports showing that it increased after
euro adoption.
Our first contribution is to estimate the causal effect of euro adoption on labor produc-
tivity. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study focusing on labor productivity.
As the introduction of a common currency can to a certain extent be considered as a
liberalization policy, since it facilitates trade by reducing costs and uncertainties due to
volatility in the exchange rates, our analysis contributes to the broader literature on the
impact of liberalization on labor productivity. Second, by using MASC we are able to
investigate an important causal channel, namely the economic complexity index. This
gives us a better understanding of how countries reacted to the introduction of the euro.
In particular, we show that to deal with the more competitive environment induced by
the common currency the economy in most of the countries experienced an increase in
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the degree of specialization that translated into an increase in labor productivity.
4.1 The introduction of the euro
The first commitment among some European countries to create an economic and mon-
etary union was made in 1971. The countries involved were the European Community
members at that time, namely: France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and
the Netherlands. Other countries joined in the following years, namely Denmark, UK, and
Ireland in 1973; Greece in 1981; and Spain and Portugal in 1986. In 1998 the euro was
introduced officially and the exchange rates of the participants were fixed. The introduc-
tion involved almost all European Community countries, with the exceptions of Denmark
and the UK, which decided not to participate (Denmark pegged its national currency to
the euro), and Greece and Sweden, which did not meet the standards required for joining
the common currency.4 The actual introduction of the euro was not completed until 2002
(see Puzzello and Gomis-Porqueras 2018 for more details on the process).
4.2 Data and MASC Implementation
We use country level panel data over the period 1986-2007. The treatment period starts
in 1998 with the official introduction of the euro. Our outcome is labor productivity
measured as output per hour worked. Data on labor productivity were taken from Penn
World Table version 9.0. To measure economic complexity (our mediator), we follow
Gabrielczak and Serwach (2017) and use the Economic Complexity Index (Hidalgo and
Hausmann 2009; Hausmann et al. 2014). The Economic Complexity Index is built and
provided by the Atlas of Economic Complexity of the Center for International Devel-
opment at Harvard University. To build the index, the complexity of each product is
defined according to the number of countries exporting it and their level of export com-
plexity (http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings/).
We implement MASC separately on five different countries adopting the euro in 1998:
Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands. We exclude Germany becauseof
4Greece joined in 2001, while Sweden decided not to participate after a referendum in 2003.
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the German reunification implies that the assumptions of our method as well as synthetic
control are likely to be violated. We furthermore exclude Luxembourg for data availability
reasons and Portugal, Spain, Greece, Austria, and Finland because the pre-intervention
overlap was poor in those countries. Details on the covariates as well as the donor pool
we used for each treated country are reported in appendix E.
To guarantee a good fit of the mediator when estimating the total effect we select the
weights to minimize both the root mean squared prediction error of the pre-treatment
outcomes and the one of the pre-treatment mediators. For the direct effect, instead, we
use a similar procedure, but we assign half of the weights to post- intervention constraints
(notice that the post- intervention constraints to identifying the direct effect at time t′
were imposed on the mediator over the period T to t′). For the calculation of the direct
effect we use a single year lag between the mediator and the outcome, but our results are
robust to the choice of different time lags. For inference we follow Firpo and Possebom
(2018) and derive the p-values from the placebo tests proposed in Abadie et al. (2015).
4.2.1 Results and Discussion
Figures 1 and 2 compare trends in the outcomes of each treated unit and their synthetic
controls constructed for calculating the total effect in the upper panel and the direct effect
in the lower one. The two figures show good pre-treatment fits for all countries. The pre-
and post-treatment fits for the mediator are fairly good for most countries (graphs are
available upon request). By graphical inspection we can already see that the total effect
is negative for Belgium and Italy, positive for France and Ireland, and close to zero for
the Netherlands. The indirect effects have a positive sign.
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(a) Belgium (b) France (c) Ireland
(d) Belgium (e) France (f) Ireland
Figure 1: Differences in the outcome between treated and synthetic units Y 0,0. The black line represents the treated outcome. The red line
represents the synthetic unit outcome.
18
(a) Italy (b) Netherlands
(c) Italy (d) Netherlands
Figure 2: Differences in the outcome between treated and synthetic units Y 0,1. The black
line represents the treated outcome. The red line represents the synthetic unit outcome.
This is confirmed by the total, direct, and indirect effects estimates displayed in table
1 and figure 3. 5
5All results are fairly robust to leaving one country out from the donor pool with few exceptions. For
example, the results for Belgium and Ireland are sensitive to the exclusion of Norway. This is due to a
lack of overlap in the pre-intervention period. See Appendix F.
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Table 1: Effects of Euro Adoption by Country
Year Belgium France Ireland Italy Netherlands
Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect
1998 -0.71 -0.81 0.10 2.69*** 2.02 0.66 6.26 6.35*** -0.09*** 1.73*** 1.48*** 0.25*** 0.46 0.33*** 0.13***
P-val (0.90) (0.40) (0.30) (0.00) (0.11) (0.22) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.70) (0.00) (0.00)
1999 -2.68 -3.04 0.36 2.47 1.88 0.59 5.33 5.27 0.06 0.61 0.61 -0.01 0.83 0.27 0.56
P-val (0.80) (0.90) (1.00) (0.22) (0.22) (0.56) (0.80) (0.80) (0.90) (0.70) (0.90) (1.00) (0.70) (0.90) (0.90)
2000 -7.60 -8.43* 0.82 3.83 2.88 0.95 4.12 3.67* 0.45*** -2.23*** -2.30*** 0.07 2.1* 0.61 1.50
P-val (0.20) (0.10) (0.40) (0.11) (0.22) (0.56) (0.30) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.60) (0.10) (0.50) (0.40)
2001 -9.17 -9.70 0.52 4.47*** 3.94 0.53 5.45 4.92 0.53 -1.88 -2.20 0.32 1.34 0.07 1.28
P-val (0.70) (0.60) (0.90) (0.00) (0.22) (0.44) (0.80) (0.60) (0.20) (0.20) (0.30) (0.70) (0.80) (1.00) (0.80)
2002 -7.08 -7.60 0.51 5.32 4.60 0.72 10.76 10.35* 0.41 -4.21*** -4.63*** 0.41 1.45* -0.07 1.52
P-val (0.20) (0.20) (0.80) (0.11) (0.11) (0.56) (0.20) (0.10) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) (0.10) (1.00) (0.80)
2003 -10.04*** -10.78*** 0.74*** 2.03 0.91 1.12 12.43*** 11.90*** 0.53*** -7.21*** -7.79*** 0.58*** -0.11*** -2.46*** 2.35***
P-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) (0.67) (0.67) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2004 -11.98*** -12.65*** 0.67*** 1.03 -0.36 1.39 12.35 11.91 0.44 -8.88 -9.78* 0.91 -0.51 -3.11 2.61
P-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) (0.56) (0.67) (0.90) (0.80) (0.40) (0.20) (0.10) (0.70) (1.00) (0.70) (0.90)
2005 -16.16 -18.09* 1.93* 2.12 1.30 0.82 9.69 8.89 0.8*** -11.19*** -12.53*** 1.34*** 1.33 -2.84 4.17***
P-val (0.50) (0.10) (0.10) (0.56) (0.56) (0.44) (0.70) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) (0.20) (0.00)
2006 -21.31 -24.01 2.70 3.01 1.86 1.15 7.54 6.40 1.13 -11.76 -13.52* 1.76 0.22 -4.33 4.54
P-val (0.80) (0.80) (0.90) (0.33) (0.56) (0.67) (0.90) (0.80) (0.40) (0.20) (0.10) (0.70) (1.00) (0.70) (0.90)
2007 -19.91*** -23.30*** 3.40*** 4.34 2.51 1.83 11.65*** 10.47*** 1.18*** -10.18*** -12.27*** 2.09*** 2.18*** -2.26*** 4.44***
P-val (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.44) (0.56) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Table 2: P-values are displayed in brackets. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.
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(a) Belgium (b) France (c) Ireland
(d) Italy (e) Netherlands
Figure 3: Total (red), direct (blue), and indirect effects (green) evolution over time.
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Our results show that Belgium and Italy saw a decrease in labor productivity, at least
in the short run, while France and Ireland recorded a small increase. In the Netherlands
the total effect was mostly small and non-statistically significant. In all countries a de-
crease in economic complexity helped facing the potentially detrimental short run effects
of a tougher competition induced by the common currency. This can be explained using
arguments from competition theory (see, e.g., Bayar 2002). Indeed, a common currency
removes the trade risks deriving from changes in the exchange rates and decreases trade
costs. Therefore, firms have to face a higher level of competition due to the reduced trade
costs. Moreover, countries are not able to increase their competitiveness through cur-
rency depreciation. Hence, firms have to specialize in producing products at the highest
productivity level. In addition, firms with a low productivity level might be forced out of
the market. At a macro level, a higher level of specialization by some firms and the exit
of unproductive ones would result in a lower complexity index and higher productivity
levels. Another possible explanation can be found in the theories of economies of scale.
Euro adoption made the realization of economies of scale easier, so that firms were able
to specialize on their most competitive products, while importing the needed intermedi-
ate products from abroad (Barro and Tenreyro 2007). This, in turns, allowed them to
increase their productivity level and lowered the economy complexity index. We find, in
all countries but Ireland (and the Netherlands during the first years), a decrease in the
economy complexity index and a positive indirect effect. Thus, the negative impact of
euro adoption on the complexity index mitigated the potential short term negative im-
pact of the introduction of a common currency (Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands) or
amplified its benefit (France and Ireland). 6
The results of the direct effects estimations are more heterogeneous. Indeed, the
direct effect is positive for France and Ireland and negative for Belgium, Italy, and the
Netherlands. One possible explanation for these differences is that the economies in those
countries are characterized by different returns of scale. The data on increasing returns
displayed in Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) corroborate this hypothesis. Indeed, France
6Results are available from the author upon request.
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has the highest returns, followed by the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy. Ireland’s returns
to scale was not particularly high, however, this country experienced a strong focus on
productivity after the introduction of the euro (Petrakos et al. 2006).
In general, the fact that, for some countries, the direct and the indirect effects go
in opposite directions, shows the advantages of using a method like MASC that allows
decomposing the total effect. Indeed, looking exclusively at the total effects of adopting
the euro on labor productivity would leave a policy maker with only partial evidence. In
particular, looking at the total effect for the Netherlands for example, one might conclude
that euro adoption did not have any impact on labor productivity. Our results suggest
that the short run effect of joining the common currency would have been negative had
the Dutch economy not reacted by increasing the level of specialization.
5 Conclusions
We introduced a new methodology called mediation analysis synthetic control (MASC).
This method combines the synthetic control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003;
Abadie et al. 2010, 2015) with the mediation analysis approach and allows us to identify
direct and indirect effects in frameworks with selection on unobservables and a low number
of treated units and control units. This method is very intuitive and easy to implement
(i.e., publicly available SCM algorithms can be employed). Even though introduced for
the procedure presented in Abadie et al. (2010, 2015), it can be easily extended to new
approaches, such as Athey et al. (2017); Xu (2017); Kreif et al. (2016); Ben-Michael et al.
(2018); and Doudchenko and Imbens (2016). Finally, after estimating the “total” effect
of the introduction of the euro on labor productivity in several European countries, we
showed that an increase in the degree of specialization in those economies either helped
to mitigate the potentially negative short run effects of adopting a common currency or
amplified its positive effects.
23
Appendix
A Derivation of “Synthetic” Y 011t
To easy the notation the subscript t is dropped from the weights. Following Abadie et al.
(2010), consider a generic vector of weights W = (wn+1, ..., wJ)′ such that wj ≥ 0 for all
j = n + 1, ..., J and wn+1 + ... + wJ = 1. With these weights (and considering the factor
model introduced in the text) the synthetic value of Y 011t is given by
J∑
j=n+1
wjYjt = ζt + ηt
J∑
j=n+1
wjXj + λt
J∑
j=n+1
wjµj + ϕt(0)
J∑
j=n+1
wjMjt(0) +
J∑
j=n+1
wjjt.
The difference between the real potential outcome and the synthetic one is then
Y 0,11t −
J∑
j=n+1
wjYjt = ηt
(
X1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjXj
)
+ λt
(
µ1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjµj
)
+ ϕt(0)
(
M1t(I{t ≥ T})−
J∑
j=n+1
wjMjt(0)
)
+
J∑
j=n+1
wj(1t − jt). (A.1)
Let Y Pi be the ((T − 1)× 1) vector with tth element equal to Yit, Pi the ((T − 1)× 1)
vector with tth element equal to it, ηP the ((T − 1)× r) matrix with tth row equal to ηt
and λP the ((T − 1) × F ) matrix with tth row equal to λt. Moreover, let ϕP (0) be the
((T − 1)× 1) vector with tth element equal to ϕt(0) and MPi (0) the ((T − 1)× 1) vector
with tth element equal to Mit(0). We can now write
Y P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjY
P
j = η
P
(
X1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjXj
)
+ λP
(
µ1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjµj
)
+ ϕP (0)
(
MP1t(0)−
J∑
j=n+1
wjM
P
jt(0)
)
+
(
P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wj
P
j
)
.
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Note that we have MP1t(0) as t < T . It is easy to see that:
λP
(
µ1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjµj
)
= Y P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjY
P
j − ηP
(
X1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjXj
)
− ϕP (0)
(
MP1t(0)−
J∑
j=n+1
wjM
P
jt(0)
)
−
(
P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wj
P
j
)
(A.2)
Similar to Abadie et al. (2010) assume that
Assumption 1.
∑T−1
t=1 λ
′
tλt is non-singular.
Assumption 1 is equivalent to assume no perfect-collinearity among unobserved com-
mon factors and implies that (λP ′λP )−1 exists. We can then multiply both sides of A.2
by (λP ′λP )−1λP ′ to get
µ1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjµj = (λ
P ′λP )−1λP
′
{
Y P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjY
P
j − ηP
(
X1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjXj
)
− ϕP (0)
(
MP1t(0)−
J∑
j=n+1
wjM
P
jt(0)
)
−
(
P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wj
P
j
)}
.
Substituting in A.1 and considering a generic post-intervention period t′ ≥ T , we have
Y 0,11t′ −
J∑
j=n+1
wjYjt′ = λt′(λ
P ′λP )−1λP
′
(
Y P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjY
P
j
)
+
(
ηt′ − λt′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′ηP
)(
X1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wjXj
)
− λt′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′
[
ϕP (0)(MP1 (0)−
J∑
j=n+1
wjM
P
j (0))
]
+ ϕt′(0)
(
M1t′(1)−
J∑
j=n+1
wjMjt′(0)
)
− λt′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′
(
P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
wj
P
j
)
+
J∑
j=n+1
wj(1t′ − jt′).
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If we now assume, as we did in the main text, that there exists a set of positive and
summing up to 1 weights W ∗ that satisfies, ∀ t = 1, ..., T − 1
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jYjt = Y1t,
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jXj = X1,
and ∀ t = 1, ..., T − 1, t′, also satisfies
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jMjt = M1t,
replacing in the post-intervention period, the generic weights with W ∗, we get
Y 0,11t′ −
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jYjt′ = −λt′(λP
′
λP )−1λP
′
(
P1 −
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j 
P
j
)
+
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j (1t′ − jt′).
From here, the proof is identical to the one in Abadie et al. (2010). We can write
Y 0,11t′ −
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jYjt′ = R1t′ +R2t′ +R3t′
where
R1t′ = λt′(λ
P ′λP )−1λP
′
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j 
P
j (A.3)
R2t′ = −λt′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′P1 (A.4)
R3t′ =
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j (jt′ − 1t′) (A.5)
Following Abadie et al. (2010), we impose the following assumptions
Assumption 2. it ⊥ jt ∀i 6= j with i, j = 1, ..., J.
Assumption 3. it ⊥ it′′ ∀t 6= t′′ with t, t′′ = 1, ..., t′.
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Assumption 4. E(it|Xi, µi,Mit(I{t ≥ T})) = E(it) = 0 for i ∈ {1, n + 1, ..., J} and
for t = 1, ..., t′
Taking the expected value on both sides of A.4 we get
E(R2t′) = E(−λt′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′P1 )
= −λt′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′E(P1 )
= 0
where the second equality follows from the fact that−λt′(λP ′λP )−1λP ′ is non-stochastic
and the third equality follows from assumption 4. Taking the expectation on both sides
of A.5
E(R3t′) = E
(
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j (jt′ − 1t′)
)
=
J∑
j=n+1
[
E(w∗j jt′)− E(w∗j 1t′)
]
=
J∑
j=n+1
[
E(w∗j )E(jt′)− E(w∗j )E(1t′)
]
= 0
where the third equality follows from the fact that weights W ∗ = w∗n+1, ..., w∗J are deter-
mined using constraints on covariates, pre-treatment period outcomes and the mediator
which under assumptions 2, 3 and 4 are independent from the error terms at time t′ ≥ T .
The fourth equality follows from assumption 4. The remaining A.3 can be rewritten as:
R1t′ =
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j
T−1∑
s=1
λt′(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh)
−1λ′sjs (A.6)
As in Abadie et al. (2010), we further assume that
Assumption 5. Let ς(M) be the smallest eigenvalue of
1
M
T−1∑
t=T−M+1
λ′tλt,
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ς(M) ≥ ς > 0 for each positive integer M.
Assumption 6.
∃ λ s.t. |λtf | ≤ λ ∀ t=1,...,t’ and f=1,...,F .
Assumption 5 guarantees that the matrix
∑T
t=1 λ
′
tλt and, consequently, its inverse, are
symmetric and positive definite. Thus, for the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have that
λt(T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′s
2 = |〈λt, Aλ′s〉|2 ≤ ||Aλt||2||Aλs||2 (A.7)
=
λt(T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′t
λs(T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′s

Where A =
(∑T−1
h=1 λ
′
hλh
)−1
. Since A is a symmetric matrixB = (T−1)A is symmetric
as well. Thus, it can be decomposed asB = GOG−1. WhereG is orthogonal andG−1 = G′
and O is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues of B as elements. Thus,
λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′t =
1
T − 1(λtBλ
′
t) =
1
T − 1(λtGOG
′λ′t)
Defining bt = λtG we have
λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′t =
1
T − 1(btOb
′
t) =
1
T − 1
(
b2t1
1
ς1
+ . . .+ b2tF
1
ςF
)
where ςi are the eigenvalues of matrix B. From assumption 5, imposing M = T − 1, we’ll
have that 1
ςi
≤ 1
ς
for i = 1, ..., F . Indeed the eigenvalues of the inverse of a matrix are given
by the inverse of the matrix eigenvalues, and B is the inverse of the matrix in assumption
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5. Consequently:
λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′t =
1
T − 1
F∑
f=1
b2tf
ςf
≤ 1
(T − 1)ς
F∑
f=1
b2tf
=
1
(T − 1)ς ||bt||
2 =
1
(T − 1)ς ||λtG||
2
As we noticed before, G is an orthogonal and thus isometric matrix, hence ||λtG|| = ||λt||.
Consequently,
λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′t ≤
1
(T − 1)ς ||λt||
2 =
∑F
f=1 λ
2
tf
(T − 1)ς ≤
∑F
f=1 λ
2
(T − 1)ς =
Fλ2
(T − 1)ς
where the last inequality follows from assumption 6. Applying the same idea to the second
part of A.7 we get
λt(T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′s
2 ≤
λt(T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′t
λs(T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′s

≤
(
Fλ2
(T − 1)ς
)2
(A.8)
Following Abadie et al. (2010) we define
Lj =
T−1∑
s=1
λT (
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh)
−1λ′sjs (A.9)
for j = n+ 1, ..., J . Assume that
Assumption 7. The pth moment of |jt| for some even p exists for j = 2, ..., J and
t = 1, ..., T − 1
Using Hölder’s Inequality and taking into account that 0 ≤ w∗j ≤ 1 for j = n+ 1, ..., J
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we have that:
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |Lj | =
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |Lj ∗ 1| ≤
(
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |Lj |p
)1/p( J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |1|q
)1/q
=
(
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |Lj |p
)1/p( J∑
j=n+1
w∗j
)1/q
=
(
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |Lj |p
)1/p
≤
(
J∑
j=n+1
|Lj |p
)(1/p)
where the last equality follow from w∗n+1 + ... + w∗J = 1 and the last inequality follows
from the condition that w∗n+1 ≤ 1, ..., w∗J ≤ 1. Applying Hölder’s Inequality again we get
E
[
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |Lj |
]
≤
(
E
[
J∑
j=n+1
|Lj |p
])1/p
(A.10)
Applying Rosenthal’s Inequality we have
E
[
|Lj |p
]
= E
∣∣∣∣∣∣
T−1∑
s=1
λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′sjs
∣∣∣∣∣∣

≤ C (p) max
T−1∑
s=1
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′sjs
∣∣∣∣∣∣
p
,
T−1∑
s=1
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′sjs
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2p/2

where C(p) is the pth moment of −1 plus a Poisson random variable with mean 1 (see
Abadie et al. (2010)). Consider the two elements of max(.). For the first element, we
have
T−1∑
s=1
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′sjs
∣∣∣∣∣∣
p = T−1∑
s=1
E

λt(T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′s
2∗(p/2) |js|p

≤
T−1∑
s=1
E
[(
Fλ2
(T − 1) ς
)2∗(p/2)
|js|p
]
=
(
Fλ2
ς
)p
1
(T − 1)p
T−1∑
s=1
E (|js|p)
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where the first equality follows from the distributivity of the power and the inequality
follows from A.8. For the second element in max (.), we have
T−1∑
s=1
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣λt
(
T−1∑
h=1
λ′hλh
)−1
λ′sjs
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2p/2 ≤
T−1∑
s=1
E
( Fλ2
(T − 1) ς
)2
2js
p/2
=
(
Fλ
2
ς
)p [T−1∑
s=1
1
(T − 1)2E
(
2js
)]p/2
where the first inequality follows from A.8. Putting all these results together have
E
[
|Lj |p
]
≤ C (p)
(
Fλ
2
ς
)p
max
 1
(T − 1)p
T−1∑
s=1
E (|js|p) ,
[
T−1∑
s=1
1
(T − 1)2E
(
2js
)]p/2
As Abadie et al. (2010), we define σ2js = E|js|2, σ2j = (1/(T − 1)
∑T−1
s=1 σ
2
js), σ2 =
maxj=n+1,...,Jσ
2
j and σ =
√
σ2. Similarly, we define τp,jt = E|jt|p, τp,j = 1(T−1)
∑T−1
t=1 τp,jt,
and τp = maxj=n+1,...,Jτp,j. We can write the first element of max(.) as
1
(T − 1)p
T−1∑
s=1
E(|js|p) = 1
(T − 1)p−1
1
(T − 1)
T−1∑
t=1
τpjt =
1
(T − 1)p−1 τpj
Similarly, the second element can be written as
[
T−1∑
s=1
1
(T − 1)2E(
2
js)
]p/2
=
(
1
T − 1
1
T − 1
T−1∑
s=1
σ2js
)p/2
=
(
1
T − 1σ
2
j
)p/2
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Thus , defining $ = C(p)(Fλ
2
ς
)p, we have
E
[
|Lj |p
]
≤ $max
(
1
(T − 1)p−1 τpj,
(
1
T − 1σ
2
j
)p/2)
J∑
j=n+1
E
[
|Lj |p
]
= E
[
J∑
j=n+1
|Lj |p
]
≤ $max
(
1
(T − 1)p−1
J∑
j=n+1
τpj,
J∑
j=n+1
(
1
T − 1σ
2
j
)p/2)
= $max
(
J − n− 1
(T − 1)p−1
1
J − n− 1
J∑
j=n+1
τpj,
1
(T − 1)p/2
J∑
j=n+1
σ
2∗p/2
j
)
(
E
[
J∑
j=n+1
|Lj |p
])1/p
≤ $1/p max

(
J−n−1
(T−1)p−1
)1/p
(J − n− 1)1/p
(
J∑
j=n+1
τpj
)1/p
,
(∑J
j=n+1 σ
2∗p/2
j
)1/p
(T − 1)(p/2)∗(1/p)

= $1/p max
( J − n− 1
(T − 1)p−1
)1/p
τ 1/pp ,
1
(T − 1)1/2
(
J∑
j=n+1
σ2∗(p/2)
)1/p
where the last equality follows from 1
J−n−1
∑J
j=n+1 τpj = E(τpj) ≤ maxj(τpj) = τp. Thus,
(
E
[
J∑
j=n+1
|Lj |p
])1/p
≤ $1/pmax
(
(J − n− 1)1/p τ 1/pp
(T − 1)1−1/p
,
(J − n− 1)σ2∗(p/2)
(T − 1)1/2
)1/p
= $1/p (J − n− 1)1/pmax
(
τ 1/p
(T − 1)1− 1p
,
√
σ2
(T − 1)1/2
)
(A.11)
this implies
E [|R1t′ |] = E
[∣∣∣∣∣
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j 
L
j
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ E
[
J∑
j=n+1
w∗j |Lj |
]
≤
(
E
[
J∑
j=n+1
|Lj |p
])1/p
≤ $1/p(J − n− 1)1/pmax
(
τ 1/pp
(T − 1)1− 1p
,
σ
(T − 1)1/2
)
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where, in the second equation, the first equality follows from A.4 and A.9, the first in-
equality follows from the triangular inequality, the second follows from A.10 and the third
from A.11. It follows that
E|R1t′ | ≤ C(p)1/pλ
2F
ς
(J − n− 1)1/p max
{
τ
1/p
p
(T − 1)1−1/p ,
σ
(T − 1)1/2
}
.
Thus, the difference between the expected value of Y 0,11t and its synthetic counterpart can
be bounded by something that goes to zero when the number of pre-intervention periods
goes to infinity, namely
E
(
Y 0,11t′ −
J∑
j=n+1
w∗jYjt′
)
= E(R1t′) = o(T ).
B Identification of δit′(1)
Finding a “synthetic” value of Y 1,01t is more challenging and requires more than 1 treated
unit. First, we need to estimate what value the mediator of unit 1 would have taken in the
absence of the intervention (M1t(0)). This could be done with a standard SCM, using the
mediator as an outcome. Second, we propose to treat the remaining treated as a control
in a SCM where we use also the distance between the first step estimate ofM1t(0) and the
other treated mediators, in computing the weights. If the number of treated is big enough,
we can also create a “synthetic” Y 1,0it′ . This is done in two steps. In a first step, we estimate
M1t′(0) by Mˆ1t′(0) =
∑J
i=n+1 k
∗
it′Mit′ with K∗t′ = (k∗n+1,t′ , . . . , k∗Jt′) chosen with a standard
SCM. Note that also those weights need to be calculated for each t′. In a second step, we
need to find a vector of positive and adding up to 1 weights Q∗t′ = (q∗2t′ , ..., q∗nt′), such that
Y 1,0it′ =
∑n
i=2 q
∗
it′Yit′ . Q∗t′ is estimated with a SCM but using only the other treated units.
More specifically, let Ωδt′ (1)1 = (X1, Y11, . . . , Y1,T−1,M11, . . . ,M1,T−1, Mˆ1t′(0)), ω
θt′ (1)
0i =
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(Xi, Y11, . . . , Yi,T−1,M11, . . . ,Mi,T−1,Mi,t′), and Ω
θt′ (1)
0 = (ω
θt′ (1)
2 , . . . , ω
θt′ (1)
n )′, then
Q∗t′ = min
qn+1,t′ ,...,qJt′
||Ωθt′ (1)1 −Qt′Ωθt′ (1)0 ||V
s.t. qn+1,t′ ≤ 0, ..., qJt′ ≤ 0,
J∑
i=n+1
qit′ = 1,
where the distance and V are defined as above for Y 0,1it′ .
Let Yˆ 1,01t′ =
∑n
i=2 q
∗
it′Yit′ , similar as before, we assume that Q∗t′ exists and satisfies
∀ t = 1, ..., T − 1
n∑
j=2
q∗jt′Yjt = Y1t,
n∑
j=2
q∗jt′Xj = X1,
n∑
j=2
q∗jt′Mjt = M1t,
∀ t = 1, ..., T − 1 and
n∑
j=2
q∗jt′Mjt′ = Mˆ1t′(0).
Under extra standard conditions and assuming that ρt′(·) is a linear function, as we show
in the appendix
E(Yˆ 1,01t′ ) = Y
1,0
1t′ + o(T ).
The latter assumption can admittedly be restrictive in many applications. However, it
is substantially weaker than assuming a constant ρt′ . Then, we can estimate the indirect
effect δit′(1) and the direct effect as θ1t′(M1t(0)) as
δˆ1t′(1) = Y1t′ − Yˆ 1,01t′ , θˆ1t′(M1t′(0)) = αˆit′ − δˆ1t′(1),
respectively. Intuitively, Q∗t′ exists under the similar assumptions as the one discussed in
the main text. However, if the number of treated is too small Yˆ 1,01t′ will be a very poor
approximation of Y 1,01t′ . In this settings it is only possible to estimate δit′(0) and θit′(1).
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C Extra assumptions on the mediator needed for Y 101t
To create a synthetic Y 101t we need to impose the standard SCM assumptions on the
mediator which are:
Assumption 8.
∑T−1
t=1 ϑ
′
tϑt is non-singular.
Assumption 9. νit ⊥ νjt ∀i 6= j with i, j ∈ {1, n+ 1, ..., J}.
Assumption 10. νit ⊥ νit′′ ∀t 6= t′′ with t, t′′ = 1, ..., t′.
Assumption 11. E(νit|{Zi, %i}i∈{1,n+1,...,J}) = E(νit) = 0 for i ∈ {1, n+ 1, ..., J} and for
t = 1, ..., t′
Assumption 12. κ(M) ≥ κ > 0 for each positive integer M, where κ(M) is the smallest
eigenvalue of
1
M
T−1∑
t=T−M+1
ϑ′tϑt. (C.1)
Assumption 13.
∃ ϑ s.t. |ϑtv| ≤ ϑ ∀ t=1,...,t’ and v=1,...,V . (C.2)
Assumption 14. ∃ a pth moment of |νjt| for some even p and for j = n + 1, ..., J and
t = 1, ..., t′
D Derivation of “Synthetic” Y 101t
As for Y 011t we drop the subscript t from the weight and we write
n∑
j=2
qjYjt = ζt + ηt
n∑
j=2
qjXj + λt
n∑
j=2
qjµj + ϕt (I{t ≥ T})
n∑
j=2
qjMjt (I{t ≥ T})
+
n∑
j=2
qjρt (Mjt (I{t ≥ T})) I{t ≥ T}+
n∑
j=2
qjjt.
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Thus,
Y 1,01t −
n∑
j=2
qjYjt = ηt
(
X1 −
n∑
j=2
qjXj
)
+ λt
(
µ1 −
n∑
j=2
qjµj
)
+ ϕt (I{t ≥ T})
(
M1t(0)−
n∑
j=2
qjMjt(I{t ≥ T})
)
+
(
ρt (M1t (0))−
n∑
j=2
qjρt (Mjt (I{t ≥ T}))
)
I{t ≥ T}
+
n∑
j=2
qj (1t − jt)
Using the same notation as before in the pre-intervention period we have
Y P1 −
n∑
j=2
qjY
P
j = η
P
(
X1 −
n∑
j=2
qjXj
)
+ λP
(
µ1 −
n∑
j=2
qjµj
)
+ ϕP (0)
(
MP1 (0)−
n∑
j=2
qjM
P
j (0)
)
+
(
P1 −
n∑
j=2
qj
P
j
)
Thus
λP
(
µ1 −
n∑
j=2
qjµj
)
= Y P1 −
n∑
j=2
qjY
P
j − ηP
(
X1 −
n∑
j=2
qjXj
)
− ϕP (0)
(
MP1 (0)−
n∑
j=2
qjM
P
j (0)
)
−
(
P1 −
n∑
j=2
qj
P
j
)
Multiplying both sides by (λP ′λP )−1λP ′ we get
µ1 −
n∑
j=2
qjµj =
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
{(
Y P1 −
n∑
j=2
qjY
P
j
)
− ηP
(
X1 −
n∑
j=2
qjXj
)
− ϕP (0)
(
MP1 (0)−
n∑
j=2
qjM
P
j (0)
)
−
(
P1 −
n∑
j=2
qj
P
j
)}
.
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Substituting in D.1 and considering a generic post-intervention period t’, we have
Y 1,01t′ −
n∑
j=2
qjYjt′ =
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
(
Y P1 −
n∑
j=2
qjY
P
j
)
+
(
ηt′ −
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
ηP
)(
X1 −
n∑
j=2
qjXj
)
−
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
ϕP (0)
(
MP1 (0)−
n∑
j=2
qjM
P
j (0)
)
+ ϕt′(1)
(
M1t′(0)−
n∑
j=2
qjMjt′(1)
)
+
(
ρt′ (M1t′ (0))−
n∑
j=2
qjρt′ (Mjt (1))
)
−
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
(
P1 −
n∑
j=2
qj
P
j
)
+
n∑
j=2
qj (1t′ − jt′)
Assume, as we did in the main text, that there exists weights q∗2, ..., q∗n that satisfy ∀t =
1, ..., T − 1
n∑
j=2
q∗jYjt = Y1t,
n∑
j=2
q∗jXj = X1,
n∑
j=2
q∗jMjt = M1t,
and it also satisfies
n∑
j=2
q∗jMjt′ = Mˆ1t′(0).
Substituting the generic weights with q∗2, ..., q∗n in the post-intervention period t′, we get
Y 1,01t′ −
n∑
j=2
q∗jYjt′ =
(
ρt′ (M1t′ (0))−
n∑
j=2
q∗jρt′ (Mjt′ (1))
)
−
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
(
P1 −
n∑
j=2
q∗j 
P
j
)
+
n∑
j=2
q∗j (1t′ − jt′)
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Note that, as by assumption
∑n
j=2 q
∗
jMt′ = Mˆ1t′(0) and Mˆ1t′(0) is estimated using a
standard SCM
E
(
ϕt′ (1)
(
M1t′(0)−
n∑
j=2
q∗jMjt′(1)
))
= o(T ).
As we mention in the main text, for identification we have to impose an extra assump-
tion, namely
Assumption 15. ρt′(.) is a linear function
Under assumption 15 we have
E
[(
ρt′ (M1t′ (0))−
n∑
j=2
q∗jρt′ (Mjt′ (1))
)]
= E
[(
ρt′ (M1t′ (0))− ρt′
(
n∑
j=2
q∗jMjt′ (1)
))]
,
= E
[(
ρt′ (M1t′ (0))− ρt′
(
Mˆ1t′(0)
))]
,
= ρt′ (M1t′ (0))− ρt′
(
E(Mˆ1t′(0))
)
= o(T ).
Thus,
Y 1,01t′ −
n∑
j=2
q∗jYjt′ = −
(
λP
′
λP
)−1
λP
′
(
P1 −
n∑
j=2
q∗j 
P
j
)
+
n∑
j=2
q∗j (1t′ − jt′) .
This, with an analogous as the one above therefore omitted proof, can be shown to
imply
E(Y 1,01t′ −
n∑
j=2
q∗jYjt′) = o(T ).
E Constraints and Donor Pool
For each treated country, we use different covariates and donor pools, trying to balance
between three different goals: obtaining satisfying pre-(post-)intervention fits for the out-
come and (or) the mediator, obtaining robust results and obtaining a synthetic unit with
covariates similar enough to those of the treated unit. In addition, data availability is an
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issue in some countries.
The variable we used came from different sources. We use data on capital stock in
constant international dollars and on investments as a percentage of GDP, coming from
the International Monetary Fund database. Data on the percentage of population older
than 25 with secondary education and those with tertiary education, on the percentage of
internet users, on the amount of trade (the sum of exports and imports of good and ser-
vices) as a share of GDP, on natural resources rents (calculated as the difference between
commodity price and its average cost of production) as a share of GDP, on the number of
patents applications per millions of residents (as a measure of technological development)
come from the World Bank. Data on total factor productivity at constant national prices
come from Penn World Table version 9.0. Data on employment share by country come
from the ILO database.
The donor pools are selected from a restricted group of countries. Indeed, following
Puzzello and Gomis-Porqueras (2018), we exclude all countries which during pre- and/or
post-treatment periods were affected by one or more conflicts with more than 1000 deaths
for at least two years, and/or those which experienced defaults or rescheduling of domestic
or foreign debt for at least three consecutive years and/or were autocracies. To determine
which countries were affected by conflicts we use data from the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (https://ucdp.uu.se/). Information on defaults and rescheduling of debts are
taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Autocracies are defined as all countries with
a value smaller than zero of the polity index developped in the Polity IV Project of
the Center for Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html). We
further exclude Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay for data availability and Denmark
because they peg their currency to the euro.
The variables we used as controls as well as the donor pool used for each treated
country are presented in table 3.
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Table 3: Donor Pool and Control Variables
country Constrained Variables Donor Pool
France Average outcome and average mediator over time frames: Australia, Sweden, Canada, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
1986-1989, 1990-1993, 1994-1997 Israel, Malasya, New Zealand, Japan, USA
Belgium Average outcome and average mediator over time frames: Australia, Sweden, Canada, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Norway,
1986-1989, 1990-1993, 1994-1997 Israel, Malasya, New Zealand, Japan, USA
Ireland All values of outcome and all values of mediator Australia, Sweden, Canada, United Kingdom, Norway, USA
over time frames: 1986-1997 Japan, Switzerland, Israel, Malasya, New Zealand
Italy Average outcome and average mediator over time frames: Australia, Sweden, Canada, Japan,
1986-1989, 1990-1993, 1994-1997 Israel, Malasya, New Zealand, USA,
Average capital stock over time frames: Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom
1986-1990, 1991-1997
Average schooling over years: 1990, 1995
Average Internet users over time frame: 1992-1997
Netherlands Average outcome and average mediator over time frames: Australia, Sweden, Canada, Japan,
1986-1989, 1990-1993, 1994-1997 Israel, Malasya, New Zealand, USA,
Average capital stock over time frames: Switzerland, United Kingdom
1986-1990, 1991-1997
Average schooling over years: 1990, 1995
Average rents of natural resources over time frames:
1986-1990, 1991-1997
Average trade over time frames: 1986-1990, 1991-1997
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F Leave-one-out Robustness Checks
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(a) Belgium (b) France (c) Ireland
(d) Italy (e) Netherlands
Figure 4: Leave-one-out robustness checks for the total effect.
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(a) Belgium (b) France (c) Ireland
(d) Italy (e) Netherlands
Figure 5: Leave-one-out robustness checks for the direct effect.
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(a) Belgium (b) France (c) Ireland
(d) Italy (e) Netherlands
Figure 6: Leave-one-out robustness checks for the indirect effect.
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